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1. Introduction1 
 
Due to the widespread use of and similarity between CFC national legislations, the 
Cadbury Schweppes’ judgement of the CJEU triggered a shockwave across the national tax 
systems in the EEA, which led most Member States to initiate the reforms of their CFC 
regimes. In contrast, the Portuguese CFC rules remain unaltered since their introduction 
in 1995 and, moreover, there are no announcements for a reform thereof for the near 
future. The potential impact of the Cadbury Schweppes’ judgement for the Portuguese CFC 
rules is apparent. The latter might indeed have to be amended in order to comply with 
the requirements set out therein. Nevertheless, as seen in Vodafone 2, should a judicial 
dispute arise the CFC regime might be capable of being interpreted by national courts in 
conformity with the former judgement. Most importantly, however, the justification 
accepted by the Court in Cadbury Schweppes (ie CFC rules must specifically target at wholly 
artificial arrangements without economic reality) reduces considerably the scope of 
application of these rules and creates opportunities for substantial tax avoidance. An 
amendment of the Portuguese CFC rules solely in light of such justification might thus 
jeopardize legitimate taxing rights of the Member State.  
 
The question whether these latter negative consequences can be overcome thus calls for 
a broader analysis under the overall framework of the case law of the Court in the areas 
of abuse and tax avoidance. In this context, there are several questions that need to be 
addressed. First, there is still no unanimity in the scholarship as regards to whether the 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Dr. Tom O’Shea for the guidance and for the comments on a 
draft of this dissertation. Any shortcomings are the sole responsibility of the author. Quoted 
excerpts from Portuguese books, journals and legislation have been translated into English by the 
author. 
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concept of prohibition of abuse constitutes a general EU principle2. Second, the 
reasoning of the Court in Cadbury Schweppes as to the role of the concept of abuse is 
blurred by references to abuse both whilst ascertaining Treaty entitlement as well as 
whilst assessing the justification of prevention of wholly artificial arrangements. In this 
context, the key question regards to the underlying meaning of the latter justification, 
namely, as to whether it should be seen under the national standpoint of tax avoidance 
(ie to prevent abuse of national fiscal provisions) or from the standpoint of a general EU 
principle of prohibition of abuse (ie to prevent abuse of EU provisions). Again, the 
answer to this question is also blurred since in the Court’s case law prior to Cadbury 
Schweppes the issue of abuse and the justification of prevention of wholly artificial 
arrangements were addressed autonomously, which seems to point in the direction that 
the latter justification merely addresses tax avoidance. However, in and after Cadbury 
Schweppes the latter justification and the issue of abuse of the fundamental freedoms 
appear intertwined under the denomination of the justification on grounds of 
“prevention of abusive practices”, which seems to point in the direction of a prohibition 
of abuse of EU provisions. Third, if the latter view is uphold, then the question that is 
triggered is whether, in light of its case law, the Court accepts any justification which 
aims directly at preventing the risk of tax avoidance, as such (ie to prevent abuse of 
national fiscal provisions).  
 
Whereas Chapter 2 will serve to introduce the case law of the CJEU concerning CFC 
rules, the respective analysis will be left to Chapter 3 which aims at answering to the 
above questions in light of the broader context of the areas of abuse and tax avoidance 
                                                 
2 The doubts as to the existence of the said general principle are visible in Paolo Piantavigna, ‘Conference 
Report: Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law?’ (2009) 3 Intertax 37, 166. 
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(in 3.1.) and at explaining (in 3.2. and 3.3.) the scope of the justification accepted by the 
Court in Cadbury Schweppes.  
 
Thereafter, the question in the title above will be addressed in Chapter 4. After setting 
out the Portuguese CFC regime and answering to the said question from the standpoint 
of the CJEU (see 4.1.) an attempt will be made to assess, firstly, whether the Portuguese 
national courts may interpret the CFC legislation in conformity with such a ruling (see 
4.2.), and, secondly, the solutions that may be available – in this case, to the Portuguese 
Government - for drafting CFC legislation in line with EU law without being limited to 
targeting wholly artificial arrangements without economic reality (see 4.3). 
 
In light of all the above, it is noted that the underlying purpose of this dissertation is, 
first, to assess whether the justification accepted in Cadbury Schweppes is sufficient to 
ensure the effectiveness of CFC rules. Second, shall the conclusion of such assessment 
be negative, the question is whether Member States may nevertheless resort to other 
justifications or alternatives which allow them to prevent artificial diversion and deferral 
of profits economically derived in their territories. Lastly, it is noted that only the 
freedom of establishment will be addressed herein since the assessment under the free 
movement of capital requires further analysis, which does not fit in the limits of this 
dissertation. 
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2. The Court’s case law on CFCs 
 
2.1. Cadbury Schweppes 3 
 
In Cadbury Schweppes, the concepts of abuse and establishment played an important 
role in the reasoning of the Court. Particularly regarding the former, the Court 
introduced for the first time in the direct tax area the two-pronged abuse test set out in 
Halifax. 
 
The UK’s CFC rules were assessed by the Court under the freedom of establishment 
seeing as they applied to “controlling holdings” of more than 50 per cent by resident 
companies which gave them a “definite influence” on the decisions of and allowed them 
to determine the activities of the CFCs. 
  
Whilst outlining the concept of abuse, the Court reiterated that nationals of Member 
States must not improperly take advantage of EU law to circumvent national law. 
Nevertheless, it confirmed that, whilst engaging in tax planning, a taxpayer could rely on 
the Treaty and benefit from the tax advantages in another Member State4. It also 
                                                 
3 The case concerned a company resident in the UK (hereinafter, “CS”) owning indirectly 100 per cent of 
two subsidiaries, both established in the IFSC in Ireland. The business of these subsidiaries was to raise 
and provide finance within the group. They had been established in Ireland for the purpose of benefiting 
from the 10 per cent tax rate and reducing the tax burden of the group. HMRC thus sought to apply the 
UK’s CFC regime since those subsidiaries were subject to a “lower level of taxation” and none of the 
exclusions provided for in the said regime were fulfilled, including the “motive test.” Accordingly, the 
respective profits were included in the tax assessment of CS.    
4 In Barbier, a Dutch national had engaged in tax planning by using the Dutch rules that recognised the 
separation between legal and financial ownership of immovable property. The Court accepted such tax 
planning (the arrangements were made solely with the intention to benefit from tax advantages) since it 
stemmed from a proper exercise of the freedom of movement.  
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repeated the judgements in Centros5 and Inspire Art where it had noted that the freedom of 
establishment is intended to enable companies to set up establishment in other Member 
States in order to pursue activities there. Thus, it concluded that, the fact that the 
exercise of such freedom was exclusively tax motivated did ‘not therefore preclude 
reliance by CS on Articles 43 and 48 EC’. 
 
As to the assessment of comparability, the Court highlighted the fact that the CFC 
legislation taxed the resident company on the profits of another legal person whereas 
resident companies with domestic subsidiaries or in a high-tax State were not taxed on 
such profits. Hence, it concluded that such different treatment hindered the exercise of 
the freedom of establishment dissuading resident companies to establish themselves in 
low-tax States.6 
 
As to the justification submitted by the UK on grounds that the CFC legislation was 
intended to counter a specific type of tax avoidance, the Court reiterated its settled case 
law7 that the tax advantages resulting from the low taxation in other Member States and 
the need to prevent the reduction of tax could not justify a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment. It also repeated its ruling in ICI that the setting-up of an establishment in 
another Member State does not necessarily entail tax avoidance and therefore cannot, by 
itself, trigger a general presumption thereof. Nevertheless, it confirmed that a restriction 
                                                 
5 In Centros, a UK company had been set-up by Danish nationals with the sole purpose of circumventing 
the requirements on the minimum paid-up capital of Danish company law. The UK company operated 
solely in Denmark through a branch and engaged in commercial activity there. Since the UK company did 
not carry on any activity in the respective territory, the Danish authorities refused to register the Danish 
branch on grounds of abuse of the freedom of establishment.  
6 Cadbury Schweppes, para 46. 
7 Avoir Fiscal, para 21. 
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of the freedom of establishment ‘may be justified where it specifically relates to wholly 
artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing the application of the legislation of the 
Member State concerned.’8  
 
Whilst ascertaining the cases where the latter justification could apply, the Court 
explained in light of the settled case law concerning abuse of EU law9 that it was 
necessary to take account of the objectives pursued by the freedom of establishment10. In 
this context, it stated that the concept of establishment presupposes an ‘actual 
establishment’ and the pursuit of a ‘genuine economic activity’ in the host State. 
Therefore, it concluded that, in order to be justified,  
…the specific objective of such a restriction must be to prevent conduct 
involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect 
economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits 
generated by activities carried out on national territory11.   
 
Therefore, after confirming that the UK’s CFC rules were suitable to achieve such 
objective, the Court assessed whether they were proportionate. It noted in this regard 
that the “motive test” did ‘not suffice to conclude that there is a wholly artificial 
arrangement intended solely to escape that tax’12 since it only excluded situations where 
there was no intention to escape UK tax. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court set out the two-pronged test outlined in Halifax and in Emsland-
Starke, according to which, both a subjective and an objective test must be fulfilled in 
                                                 
8 Cadbury Schweppes, para 51. 
9 See Centros, para 25 and Paletta II, para 25. 
10 Cadbury Schweppes, para 53. 
11 Ibid, para 55.  
12 Ibid, para 63. 
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order to conclude that ‘the objective pursued by freedom of establishment … has not 
been achieved’13. As to the former, it consists in ascertaining on the basis of objective 
circumstances whether the incorporation of the CFC constituted an “actual 
establishment” intended to carry on “genuine economic activities” in the host Member 
State (“economic reality” test). The Court pointed out that such a finding must ‘be based 
on objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to 
the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment’. 
The Court illustrated this with the existence of a “letterbox” or “front” subsidiary in the 
host State. In addition, it noted that ‘the resident company, which is best placed for that 
purpose, must be given an opportunity to produce evidence that the CFC is actually 
established and that its activities are genuine.’14 
 
Ultimately, the Court decided to refer the case back to the Special Commissioners to 
determine whether, as contended by the HMRC, the “motive test” could be interpreted 
in a way which could be restricted to wholly artificial arrangements or whether, on the 
contrary - where the intention to reduce the tax burden in the UK was central for the 
incorporation of the CFC - the “motive test” meant that the resident company was 
subject to the UK’s CFC rules even in the absence of objective evidence of a wholly 
artificial arrangement. In the former case, the UK CFC rules should not apply where, on 
the basis of the aforementioned objective criteria, it was proven that the CFC was 
actually established in the host Member State and carried on genuine economic activities 
there. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Cadbury Schweppes, para 64. 
14 Cadbury Schweppes, para 70. 
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2.2. CFC GLO  
 
The Cadbury Schweppes’ judgment was confirmed by the Court in its reasoned order 
delivered in CFC GLO, which, in part, also concerned the UK’s CFC rules. Nevertheless, 
this case is important in that – although merely applying previous judgements - it seems 
to clarify the reasoning of the Court in Cadbury Schweppes regarding compliance 
requirements and the burden of proof. 
 
Indeed, whilst breaking down its statement in paragraph 70 of Cadbury Schweppes15 in two, 
the Court showed that it addressed in such sentence both the compliance requirements 
and the opportunity for taxpayers to produce evidence. It explained, regarding the 
former that, ‘the resident company is best placed to establish that it has not entered into 
wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality’. Regarding the latter, 
it noted that ‘it must be given an opportunity to produce evidence that the CFC is 
actually established and that its activities are genuine. 16 
 
As to the compliance requirements, not only did the Court accept that they could be 
required by the Member States, as long as they do not entail undue administrative 
constraints, but also seemed to have the view that they were indeed necessary since they 
‘are inherent in the assessment … on which the compatibility of the legislation on CFCs 
rests.’17  
 
                                                 
15 See above, note 14. 
16 CFC GLO, para 82. 
17 Ibid, para 83. 
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Regarding the opportunity to produce evidence that the CFC is actually established and 
that its activities are genuine, the Court went on to reproduce its statement in Thin Cap 
that national legislation  
… is to be considered as not going beyond what is necessary to prevent 
abusive practices where, on each occasion on which the existence of such an 
arrangement cannot be ruled out, the taxpayer is given an opportunity, 
without being subject to undue administrative constraints, to provide 
evidence of any commercial justification. 18 
 
The Court thus seemed to draw a parallel with Thin Cap, where it had held that, firstly, 
the Member States’ legislation must foresee objective and verifiable elements (such as the 
arm’s length test) in order to ascertain whether a transaction represents a purely artificial 
arrangement and, secondly, at a subsequent level (ie ‘on each occasion on which the 
existence of such an arrangement cannot be ruled out’), the resident company must be 
given an opportunity to provide evidence of any commercial justification that there may 
have been for that arrangement.  
 
Additionally, the Court noted that free movement of capital applied since there was a 
portfolio shareholding of less than 10 per cent, which was seen as not conferring definite 
influence over the company’s decisions or activities. Regarding the question whether the 
judgment of the Court would be different if third countries were involved, it recalled that 
only the free movement of capital is extended to third countries, and that, situations 
involving third countries take place in a different legal context because of the different 
degree of legal integration.  
 
 
                                                 
18 CFC GLO, para 84 and Thin Cap, paras 80 -  81. 
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2.3. Columbus Container 19 
 
In contrast with Cadbury Schweppes, the Columbus Container case provides an example of 
how Member States can put in place CFC rules without entailing different treatment.  
 
The partners of Columbus argued that there was a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment since the German switch-over clause created a higher tax burden than they 
would have if they had invested in Germany. However, the Court held that there was no 
such restriction since Germany did not treat Columbus’ profits differently from the 
profits of a German partnership. Whilst recalling the judgement in Kerckhaert-Morres, it 
noted that the adverse consequences which might arise resulted from the ‘exercise in 
parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty’20. 
  
Moreover, the contention - made by the taxpayer and supported in AG Mengozzi’s 
Opinion21 - that the German rules created a distortion on the choice of the Member State 
of establishment in favour of Member States where the legislation at issue did not apply 
was not accepted by the Court, which noted that in the current state of harmonisation of 
EU tax law Member States enjoy a certain autonomy and are therefore not obliged to 
adapt their tax systems to the differences between the systems of other Member States. 
                                                 
19Columbus Container (hereinafter, “Columbus”) was a Belgium non-transparent partnership - wholly 
owned by German residents - benefiting from the low tax rates of the Belgian coordination centres’ 
regime. In Germany the partnership was treated as transparent and therefore its profits were taxed in the 
hands of the shareholders. The Germany-Belgium DTC provided for an exemption of German tax on the 
profits derived in Belgium. However, regarding “designated passive income” of CFCs, the German 
domestic legislation switched over the said exemption method to a method of set-off of Belgium tax 
against the taxable amount in Germany. 
20 Columbus Container, para 43. 
21 See Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Columbus Container, paras 120-121. 
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2.4. Vodafone 2 22 
 
Vodafone 2 provides a prime example of the issues that may arise before the Portuguese 
national courts whilst assessing the compatibility of the Portuguese CFC rules with EU 
Law. Following the Cadbury Schweppes’ decision, the main issue was whether the UK’s 
CFC legislation could be interpreted in conformity with EU law.  
 
The ultimate decision, by the Court of Appeal, reversed Evans-Lombe J’s ruling in the 
High Court, according to which, the addition of further conditions to the CFC legislation 
with a view to construe the latter in conformity with EU Law would constitute a 
legislative amendment of the wording rather than a judicial interpretation thereof. The 
initial decision of the Special Commissioners was thus uphold by the Court of Appeal, 
albeit on somewhat different grounds. Namely, it rejected the contention by Vodafone 
223 that only the “motive test” could be considered for purposes of conforming 
interpretation. Firstly, the Court noted that the jurisdiction of the CJEU to give 
preliminary rulings concerned to the interpretation of the EC Treaty and not to the 
interpretation of national legislation. Secondly, it noted that ‘the obligation of the 
national court is to examine the whole of the national law to consider how far it may be 
applied so as to conform to enforceable Community rights.’24 
 
Whilst holding the view that the obligation of conforming interpretation was ‘both broad 
and far-reaching’, it ruled that the CFC legislation should be construed in such a way as 
                                                 
22 Whilst seeking to apply the UK’s CFC rules, HMRC issued an enquiry notice to Vodafone 2 regarding a 
Luxembourg subsidiary. Vodafone 2 argued that the UK’s CFC legislation was in breach of the freedom of 
establishment.  
23 Which relied, in particular, on para 72 of the Cadbury Schweppes’ judgment. 
24 Vodafone 2, para. 34. 
 25 
to introduce an additional exception to the application thereof if the CFC was actually 
established in another Member State and carried on genuine economic activities there. In 
that regard, Longmore LJ noted that  
… Any inquiry as to motive as originally envisaged by the Act, is likely to 
encompass the question whether the resulting CFC is an artificial 
arrangement; the proposed insertion merely makes clear that CFCs which are 
not artificial arrangements will be exempt from the provisions of s 747(1). 25 
 
The Court of Appeal thus agreed with the view of HMRC that ‘the “grain” or “thrust” of 
the legislation was to cast the initial net wide as in s.747(3) and then narrow it by the 
overlapping exceptions set out in s.748(1)(a) to (e) and (3)’. Thus, the Court held that the 
UK’s CFC legislation was susceptible of conforming interpretation with the Cadbury 
Schweppes’ requirements. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid, para 71. 
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3. Analysis 
 
3.1. The doctrine of Abuse 
 
 
A) The prohibition of abuse as a general principle of EU Law 
 
As noted since Centros26 and X and Y27, the concept of prohibition of abuse used by the 
Court consists of impeding the improper use of a rule either through ‘measures designed 
to prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by 
the Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals 
from improperly’ ‘or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community law’. 
Such prohibition of abuse was expressly recognised in Kofoed as a ‘general Community 
principle.’28 Hence, the rationale of such principle receives inspiration from the anti-
avoidance doctrines and rules adopted by the Member States29. This is apparent, for 
example, from the Court’s decision in Diamandis where the defendant relied on a national 
general anti-abuse provision to ward off a claim made under the Second Company Law 
                                                 
26 Centros, para 24. 
27 X and Y, para 41. 
28 In Kofoed the issue was whether an arrangement set up by two Danish taxpayers amounted to an abuse of 
a direct tax exemption provided for by the Merger Directive. Under article 11(1) (a) of that Directive, 
Member States may withdraw the benefits of the provisions thereof where the arrangement has mainly tax 
avoidance objectives. The Court said that such article is the codification of the general EU principle that 
rights conferred by the Directive should not be abused. 
29 In Algera the Court stated that the recourse to general principles of EU law was made ‘by reference to 
the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writings and the case-law of the Member States’. See, 
L. Neville Brown, ‘Is there a general principle of abuse of rights in European Community Law?’ in Dirdre 
Curtin & Ton Heukels (eds), Institutional Dynamics of European Integration, Essays in honour of Henry G. Schemers 
(vol II, Martinus Nijhoff Poublishers, London, 1994), p 512-513. 
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Directive to invalidate a capital increase. The Court accepted the application of that 
provision for the purpose of establishing abuse of EU law as the rule allowed in each 
particular case to establish on the basis of objective circumstances that the intention 
(subjective element) to claim an advantage under the Directive that frustrated the 
objectives of the Directive in the given circumstances (objective element).  
 
One of the basic elements in every avoidance conduct is that a given objective is attained 
through an inappropriate arrangement30, which, in order to be considered as such, 
presupposes the existence of and therefore requires a comparison with an appropriate 
arrangement. This comparison must take into account not the legal form logically 
appropriate to the economic aim pursued but rather the purpose and objectives of the 
allegedly abused provision. Following the reasoning held in Centros and Paletta II31, this 
view was clearly adopted in Cadbury Schweppes where the Court noted that ‘it is necessary, 
in assessing the conduct of the taxable person, to take particular account of the objective 
pursued by the freedom of establishment.”’32  
 
The rise of a EU law principle of abuse thus triggers an additional issue for the Member 
States having anti-abuse measures since the nature of the provisions whose objectives 
have to be assessed under the said principle (chiefly, the freedoms of movement) is 
different from that of the provisions whose objectives would otherwise be assessed 
under the national anti-abuse measures (ie, national tax rules). Furthermore, whereas in 
                                                 
30 Violeta R. Almendral, ‘Tax Avoidance and the European Court of Justice: What is at Stake for European 
General Anti-Avoidance Rules?’ (2005) 33 Intertax 12, 560 
31 See above, note 9. 
32 Cadbury Schweppes, para 52. The same rationale is contained in article 334 (“Abuse of the right”) of the 
Portuguese Civil Code, which deems illegitimate the exercise of a right that clearly exceeds the limits 
imposed by ‘the social or economic purpose’ thereof.  
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the latter case it is the national courts’ role, in that capacity, to interpret the objectives of 
the anti-abuse provisions, in the former case it is a matter of interpretation of EU law 
and therefore a task for the CJEU. Likewise, the recognition of the said principle means 
that EU primacy over national and treaty law requires these two levels of law to meet the 
compliance standards set forth by the CJEU concerning the design of national anti-
avoidance measures33. Thus, one of the consequences of Cadbury Schweppes for the 
Member States is that any restriction on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms 
stemming from national anti-avoidance rules is only justified in the context of tax 
avoidance - it is noted, as a standalone defence34 - if it specifically targets the improper 
use of the fundamental freedoms and not simply the improper use of national tax rules.  
 
 
B) Prevention of abusive practices versus prevention of tax avoidance 
 
i) The justification of prevention of abusive practices 
 
In Cadbury Schweppes, the Court used the expression ‘justification on the ground of 
prevention of abusive practices’ when it was analysing whether the UK’s CFC rules were 
specifically related to wholly artificial arrangements35. Although this does not constitute a 
new justification, it seems that the Court wants to make it clear that it does not focus on 
tax avoidance as such (ie on the abuse of national tax rules) but rather on the abuse of 
                                                 
33 F. Vanistendael,  ‘Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes: one single European theory of abuse in tax law?’ 
(2006) EC T.R. 15, 195. 
34 This is explained below in 3.1. B), ii). 
35 Cadbury Schweppes, para 55. See also, Thin Cap, para 71. 
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EU provisions, being therefore a EU law concept of abuse 36. As illustrated in Cadbury 
Schweppes, the Court only accepts a restriction of the fundamental freedoms on grounds 
of tax avoidance, as a standalone defence, if and to the extent that these freedoms are 
not being actually and genuinely exercised. Therefore, it is the assessment required by the 
Court as to the purposive scope of the applicable freedom of movement that defines the 
“freedom” by EU nationals to arrange their tax affairs. Thus, ‘legitimate tax mitigation or 
tax planning is nothing more than a side effect or an indirect consequence from the 
exercise of the free’37 movement in the European internal market.  
 
Since it uses the yardstick of abuse of EU freedoms of movement, the Court has thus 
not distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance as such. Firstly, 
such constitutes a distinction of a fiscal nature - the interpretation of which, in the 
absence of harmonization at EU level, cannot be resorted to EU law - and therefore falls 
outside the competence of the Court38. Secondly, as explained below in 3.1. B), ii), the 
Court has not accepted until now the protection of tax avoidance, as such, as a 
standalone justification in the direct tax area. In particular, the Court made it clear in X 
and Y39 and in de Lasteyrie du Saillant40 that tax evasion or tax fraud ‘cannot justify a fiscal 
measure which compromises the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty’. Rather, provided there is a genuine exercise of the fundamental freedoms, 
                                                 
36 As noted by Luca Cerioni, in the field of tax law, wholly artificial arrangements are synonymous of 
abuse. Luca Cerioni, ‘The "abuse of right" in EU company law and tax law: a re-reading of the ECJ case-
law and the quest for a unitary notion’ (26 February, 2010), 11. Similarly: Luc de Broe, International Tax 
Planning and Prevention of Abuse - A Study under Domestic Tax Law, Tax Treaties and EC Law in relation to Conduit 
and Base Companies (IBFD Publications BV, Amsterdam, 2008), p 808.  
37 Violeta R. Almendral (n 30). 
38 See Tom O'Shea, EU Tax Law and Double Tax Conventions (Avoir Fiscal Limited, london, 2008), 174. 
39 X and Y, para 61. 
40 De Lasteyrie du Saillant, para 51.  
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taxpayers can rely thereupon solely for tax purposes. Namely, in Barbier41, the Court held 
that the freedoms of movement could not be hindered ‘on the ground that he is profiting 
from tax advantages which are legally provided by the rules in force in a Member State 
other than his State of residence’. This case law is also consistent with the decisions in 
the non-tax area, namely in Centros, Inspire Art, Chen42 and Akrich43 where the Court 
confirmed that, where the rights provided by EU law are genuinely exercised, the 
motives of the nationals of Member States or even of third countries cannot call into 
question the protection derived therefrom. 
  
 
ii) The justification on grounds of prevention of (the risk of) tax avoidance 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the Court’s judgement in SGI44 came to reveal with clarity 
that national legislation not specifically designed to exclude purely artificial arrangements 
can still be justified with the need to prevent tax avoidance, provided – however - that it 
                                                 
41 See above, note 4. 
42 In Chen, two Chinese nationals set up an arrangement with a series of steps in order to obtain UK 
residency. Mrs. Chen travelled to Ireland to give birth to her child there in order for the latter to acquire 
Irish nationality and, thereby, be entitled to reside in the EU. The Court confirmed that the arrangements 
put in place had the sole purpose of enabling Mrs. Chen to reside with her child in the UK. Nevertheless, it 
held that since Irish nationality had been legally obtained, ‘it was not permissible for a Member State to 
restrict the effects of the grant of nationality of another Member State’. 
43 Akrich was a Moroccan national, which, after having married with a UK citizen, was deported to Ireland, 
where the latter had established herself to work there. Less than a year later, the latter applied for a 
revocation of his deportation order since she was returning to the UK. It was common ground that the 
couple had moved to Ireland in order to be entitled to return to the UK. The Court held that there was no 
abuse since the motives could not be taken into account where the marriage was genuine. See also, Metock. 
44 SGI, para 63. In SGI, a restriction was triggered by Belgium since suspicious advantages (namely, below 
arm’s length) granted to connected parties in other Member States were added-back and taxed upon 
residents. 
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can be “taken together” with the justification of preservation of a balanced allocation of 
taxing rights. As noted by Dr. Tom O’Shea, in Marks & Spencer45 the Court had already 
dealt with tax avoidance in the context of the justification concerning the need to 
preserve a balanced allocation of taxing rights. This latter justification was, for the most 
part, accepted by the Court and consisted in preserving “symmetry” between the taxation 
of profits and the relief of losses, so that the UK was not under the obligation to grant 
relief for losses in respect of subsidiaries taxed in other Member States. Nevertheless, 
“understanding the relationship between these two uses of the concept of tax avoidance 
was (…) quite difficult because in the first instance, the justification involving the 
prevention of tax avoidance could clearly stand on its own, whereas in the second 
instance it was merely taken together with the need to safeguard a balance in the 
allocation of taxing rights between the member states.” 46 Indeed, afterwards in Oy AA, 
whilst assessing the latter justification and the justification of prevention of the risk of 
tax avoidance (ie “income trafficking”), the Court accepted that ‘even if the legislation at 
issue … is not specifically designed to exclude … purely artificial arrangements’ … ‘such 
legislation may nevertheless be regarded as proportionate to the objectives pursued, 
taken as whole.’ 47 Interestingly, this view of the concept of tax avoidance in the context 
of “symmetry” between the taxing rights of the Member States seems to resemble to the 
statement of the Court in ICI that, in that case, the setting up of an establishment did not 
                                                 
45 Marks & Spencer, paras 51 and 57. In Marks&Spencer, UK group relief was limited to losses of domestic 
subsidiaries. The Court accepted the three justifications put forward for the said restriction of the freedom 
of establishment, taken together: the danger that losses could be used twice, the risk of tax avoidance (ie 
“loss trafficking”) and the need to protect a balanced allocation of taxing rights. However, the Court held 
that, where the losses of those subsidiaries were terminal in the host State, it would be disproportionate for 
the UK to deny relief for those losses. 
46 Tom O'Shea, 'ECJ Upholds Belgian Transfer Pricing Regime'  [2010] WTD 1. 
47 Oy AA, paras 65 and 66. In Oy AA, the restriction of the freedom of establishment stemmed from the 
limitation to domestic situations of the deductions of intra-group financial transfers provided for in the 
Finnish legislation.  
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“of itself, necessarily entail tax avoidance, since that company will in any event be subject 
to the tax legislation of the State of establishment.”48 
 
As to the applicability of such justification in the CFC area, it must be noted that the 
Court observed in Cadbury Schweppes that the abusive conduct at issue was also capable of 
jeopardising the balance in the allocation of taxing rights. Thus, it seemed implicitly to 
accept that a justification on these grounds could also be suitable to counter the practices 
targeted by CFC legislation.  
 
Whilst requiring that the justification of prevention of tax avoidance be taken together 
with the justification of the need to preserve a balanced allocation of taxing rights, the 
Court thus kept its consistency with the judgment in Avoir Fiscal where it had rejected 
any restriction of the freedom of establishment on grounds of the risk of tax avoidance49. 
 
 
iii) Two different sets of justifications in the context of tax avoidance 
 
In conclusion, it seems clear from the SGI decision that the Court accepts in the context 
of tax avoidance that a restriction be justified, either where it is specifically targeted at 
wholly artificial arrangements or, where that is not the case, by the objective of 
preventing tax avoidance taken together with that of preserving a balanced allocation of 
taxing rights 50.  
 
                                                 
48 ICI, para. 26. 
49 See, Avoir Fiscal, para 25, and ICI para 26. 
50 See, Tom O'Shea (n 46). 
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Furthermore, in light of all the above said, it seems that the fundamental difference 
between those two sets of justifications lies on the fact that, whereas the latter takes into 
account fiscal concerns, the former constitutes, in essence, a prohibition of abuse of EU 
law. Therefore, in light of the broad scope of the fundamental freedoms, the Court 
adopts a narrow approach in dealing with the latter type of justification51. Conversely, the 
scope of the justification of the prevention of tax avoidance seems to be wider, being the 
Court satisfied to accept its application where there is a “risk” of tax avoidance (ie even 
where the freedoms are genuinely exercised). Thus, the latter justification should not be 
overlooked by the Member States. 
 
 
C) Abuse, treaty entitlement and justification 
 
In contrast with the approach adopted in the AG Léger’s Opinion – which dealt with the 
issue of abuse for the purposes of ascertaining treaty entitlement - the Court in Cadbury 
Schweppes left the main part of the analysis of abuse to the moment of assessment of the 
justification. Although in its case law it distinguishes the question whether EU law is 
engaged from the question whether there can be said to be abuse52, in this case the Court 
did not draw a clear line between these two issues. Indeed, where the economic activity 
of the taxpayer lacks sufficient substance to be deemed as a genuine exercise of a 
freedom of movement, the Court may conclude that the taxpayer should not be entitled 
                                                 
51  Tridimas Takis, 'Abuse of Right in EU Law: Some Reflections with particular Reference to Financial 
Law' in Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27/2009 (London, 
2009), p 13. See Luc de Broe (n 36), p 766. 
52 In Ninni-Orasche (para 31), for example, the Court made this distinction by stating that the abuse of EU 
law ‘presupposes that the person concerned falls within the scope “ratione personae” of that Treaty’. See 
also, inter alia, TV10, and Centros, para 18. 
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to rely on such a freedom either on grounds of lack of treaty entitlement53 or on grounds 
of the justification of prevention of abusive practices.54 Whilst dealing with the issue at 
stake under the heading of abuse and at the level of the justification, the Court refrained 
from assessing it from a simplistic “all or nothing” standpoint (whereby, if successful, the 
freedom at stake would be simply set aside) and rather adopted the “Gebhard formula” 
as an instrument which allows it ‘to evaluate legislation which, like the curate’s egg, is 
only bad in part’55. Indeed, this seems to be a trend of the Court’s judgements in the area 
of abuse, at least, since the judgements in Centros and Inspire Art56.  
 
 
3.2. Restriction of the freedom of establishment 
 
The Court reiterated in the case law on CFCs that the origin States are also obliged to 
eliminate any restrictions on the freedom of establishment on their ‘nationals or of a 
company incorporated under its legislation.’57 Moreover, it confirmed in Cadbury 
Schweppes that comparability in origin State situations is assessed between a resident 
exercising a freedom of movement and a resident pursuing an equivalent action 
domestically.  
                                                 
53 The Court adopted this approach in its less recent case law, for instance, in Gullung where a “U-turn” 
had been created by a French national in order to avoid the prohibition to register as a lawyer in France. 
The Court held that the French rules should be interpreted as meaning that its provisions could not be 
relied upon in the case of an artificial arrangement. 
54 Concurring: Denis Weber, Tax Avoidance and the EC Treaty Freedoms - A Study of the Limitations under 
European Law to the Prevention of Tax Avoidance (Kluwer Law International, Amsterdam, 2005), 12. 
55 Vanessa Edwards and Paul Farmer, ‘The concept of abuse in the freedom of establishment of 
companies: a case of double standards?’ in Anthnoy Arnull at al (eds), Continuity and change in EU law - 
Essays in honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), 215. 
56 As noted in AG Geelhoed’s Opinion in Akrich para 105. 
57 Cadbury Schweppes, para 42 and Columbus Container, para 33. 
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Following the AG’s Opinion in Cadbury Schweppes,58 the Court not only compared a UK 
resident parent company setting up a CFC subject to low taxation with a UK resident 
parent company setting up an establishment of a controlled company in the UK but also 
equated the latter situation to the establishment by a UK resident parent company of a 
CFC in a State in which it is not subject to a lower level of taxation, since in the latter 
situation the UK’s CFC rules did also not apply59.  
 
This reasoning of the Court was neither confirmed nor rejected60 in Columbus Container 
since - in contrast with the contention of the taxpayers and the AG Mengozzi’s Opinion 
- 61, the Court did not answer that argument in light of Cadbury Schweppes but rather from 
the standpoint of Kerckhaert-Morres.  
 
 
3.3. Wholly artificial arrangements 
 
 
A) Objective test 
 
Whilst referring in Cadbury Schweppes to ‘wholly artificial arrangements which do not 
reflect economic reality’ the Court stressed the objective limb of the two-pronged abuse 
test set out in Emsland-Starke, according to which an abusive practice can only exist if it is 
                                                 
58 See AG Léger Opinion in Cadbury Schweppes paras 78 – 83. 
59 Tom O'Shea, 'The UK's CFC rules and the freedom of establishment: Cadbury Schweppes plc and its 
IFSC subsidiaries - tax avoidanceor tax mitigation?' (2007) 16 EC T.R. 1, 13, p 29 and Luc de Broe (n 36), 
p 981. 
60 Differently, Chris Morgan and Jonathan Bridges, ‘Columbus Container’ (2008) 1 Tax Journal 918. 
61 AG Mengozzi’s Opinion, para 133. 
 36 
found ‘a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of 
the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not 
been achieved.’ 62 Indeed, as held in Centros (see above, 3.1. A), i)), an abusive practice 
consists of the object and purpose of the EU law provision at stake not being fulfilled by 
the action of the economic operator. On the other hand, the Court does not accept a 
restriction of the freedom of establishment where the objectives and purpose thereof 
may be fulfilled. Therefore, it requires that the “specific objective” of the national 
provision to exclude (only) the cases where the incorporation does not correspond to an 
“actual establishment” intended to carry on “genuine economic activities”. In de 
Lasteyrie63, for example, the Court held that the French exit tax rule constituted a 
disproportionate restriction of the right of establishment since it encompassed all French 
shareholders regardless of whether they sold their shares while being outside France64. 
Likewise, in Cadbury Schweppes it seemed to diverge from the AG’s Opinion, which 
accepted the use of a presumption of tax avoidance targeting services such as those of 
raising and providing finance, merely on the grounds of the risk of existing no real 
substance in the host State65. With effect, as held in X and Y the Court only accepts the 
prevention of wholly artificial arrangements, case by case, and ‘on the basis of objective 
evidence of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the persons concerned.’ 66 
 
                                                 
62 Emsland-Starke, paras 52-53. See also Halifax, paras 74-75.   
63 The case concerned a French national who established himself in Belgium. As he was a substantial 
shareholder in French companies, France levied its exit taxation on migrating substantial shareholders on 
grounds of prevention of avoidance of capital gains tax. 
64 De Lasteyrie, para 54.  
65 AG Léger Opinion in Cadbury Schweppes, paras 134 to 140. 
66 X and Y, paras 42 - 43. 
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As to the criteria for finding an “actual establishment” and the pursuit of a “genuine 
economic activity”, the Court also required in Cadbury Schweppes a much higher level of 
artificiality than in the AG’s Opinion. Indeed, it did not address the test of genuine 
nature of the services provided by the CFC (which asks whether the subsidiary has 
enough control and competence to take decisions) and the test of the value added by the 
subsidiary’s activity - both set out in the AG’s Opinion. Rather, whilst referring to 
“letterbox” of “front” subsidiaries, the Court required the presence of objective factors, 
which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which 
the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment. As noted in 
Eurofoods IFSC, ‘that objectivity and that possibility of ascertainment by third parties are 
necessary in order to ensure legal certainty and foreseeability’67, which, in their turn, 
constitute general principles of EU law. 
 
Although it is not clear the reason why the Court did not mention the other two tests set 
out in the AG’s Opinion, there seems to be a difference between the nature of these tests 
and the nature of the CFC rules. Indeed, whereas the latter incorporate an all-or-nothing 
approach (whereby, where the CFC rules apply, all the profits are attributed to the 
shareholders), the former incorporate a transfer pricing assessment that proportionately 
tackle arrangements not fulfilling the arm’s length test but which may nevertheless have 
economic substance (ie partial rather than wholly artificial arrangements). It is thus 
doubtful whether these tests could be considered proportionate in this case since the 
CFC legislation in Cadbury Schweppes did not limit the taxation to the artificial part of the 
arrangement but, rather, it (“wholly”) encompassed all the profits of the CFC. 
 
 
                                                 
67 Eurofoods IFSC, para 33. 
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B) Subjective test 
 
The Court did not give much guidance in Cadbury Schweppes as to the manner how 
Member States should determine the subjective element. One of the reasons that might 
explain this is that, as submitted below, the subjective element may be superfluous or at 
least residual vis-à-vis the objective element.  
 
The Court defined the subjective element in Emsland-Starke as an ‘intention to obtain an 
advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down for 
it’68. Hence, ‘the Court links this subjective test to the finding that the situation giving rise 
to the application of a Community rule was purely artificial’69. Therefore, it requires a 
determination of the purpose of the arrangement – rather than of the motives of the 
parties – which is to be inferred from the artificiality thereof.   
 
Indeed, in Veronica and in TV10, the Court implicitly accepted that the objective 
circumstances put before him were enough to find that ‘the broadcasting body was 
established there in order to enable it to avoid the rules which would be applicable to it if 
it were established within the first State’70. Also, in Vonk and in Emsland-Starke, the Court 
noted that the intention to abuse EU law could be established, in those cases, by 
evidence ‘that there was collusion between that exporter and the importer of the goods 
into the non-member country’71. This also seems to be in line with Halifax where the 
                                                 
68 Emsland-Starke, para 53. 
69 Luc De Broe (n 36), p 767.  
70 TV 10, para 26. 
71 Emsland-Starke, para 59 and Vonk, para 33.  
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Court found that the subjective test must ‘be apparent from a number of objective 
factors’ 72.  
 
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that in Emsland-Starke the Court required a 
‘combination of objective circumstances’ and therefore, arguably, the mere existence of a 
legal, personal or economic relation should not in itself be enough to demonstrate an 
intention of abuse. In particular, ‘a party’s subjective intention of avoidance cannot be 
inferred from circumstances over which the party has no direct control’73. 
  
To sum up, it seems that the intentions should be inferred from an objective assessment 
since ‘form reveals purpose’74. In any case, it must be borne in mind that the objective 
and subjective elements serve different purposes. Whereas the former pertain to the 
scope of the EU right being exercised, and is therefore for the CJEU to ascertain, the 
latter pertains to the intentions inherent in the conduct of the taxpayer, which is a matter 
for the national courts. 
 
 
C) Onus of proof 
 
The Court did not seem to provide express guidance in Cadbury Schweppes regarding the 
burden of proof. Indeed, the statement referred in para 70 thereof75 does not seem to 
                                                 
72 Halifax, para 75. 
73 Dennis Weber,  (n 54), 191. 
74 Graemer Cooper, ‘International experience with general anti-avoidance rules’ (2001) 54 Southern 
Methodist University Law Review 83, 100.  
75 See above, n. 14. 
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impose the burden of proof upon the taxpayer76. Rather, as explained above in 2.2., 
concerning CFC GLO, the Court only confirmed that compliance requirements could be 
laid upon the taxpayers and that the tax authorities are required to show, in light of the 
evidence provided thereby, that the CFC does not have ‘economic reality’. This is fully 
consistent with the decision in Cadbury Schweppes where the Court held that there must be 
objective circumstances showing that the objective of the freedom of establishment has 
not been achieved. Thereafter, where the tax authorities succeed to prove these objective 
circumstances, the taxpayer must have the opportunity to prove that the CFC is actually 
established and that its activities are genuine. 
 
Indeed, it seems to follow from the parallel drawn by the Court in CFC GLO vis-à-vis 
Thin Cap77 that CFC legislation can only be justified if targeted at objective and verifiable 
elements showing that there is a wholly artificial arrangement that does not reflect 
economic reality. Like the arm’s length test in Thin Cap, these objective and verifiable 
elements do not seem to constitute definitive evidence but rather targeted 
presumptions78 which, ‘on each occasion on which the existence of such an arrangement 
cannot be ruled out’, the taxpayer should be given the opportunity to rebut. 
 
To sum up, and in accordance with the procedural rules of most – if not all – Member 
States79, the burden of proof of the fulfilment of the “economic reality test” seems to fall 
                                                 
76 Differently, Gerard T. Meussen, ‘Cadbury Schweppes: The ECJ Significantly Limits the Application of 
CFC Rules in the Member States’ (2007) ET, 17 and Anna B. Scapa Passalacqua and Lars A. Henie ‘The 
Norwegian CFC rules after the Cadbury Schweppes case’ (2008) 36 Intertax 8/9, 381. 
77 See above, 2.2.. 
78 Concurring: Luc de Broe (n 36), 912, and Dennis Weber (n 46), 216 and 230. However, no conclusive 
view was set out by these authors as to what should be the objective criteria triggering the presumption. 
79 A conflict with procedural rules of the Member States would breach the EU principles of institutional 
and procedural autonomy of national courts set forth in Rewe. 
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upon the tax authorities. On the other hand, such test seems to constitute a targeted 
presumption which must be able to be rebutted by the taxpayer.  
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4. Compatibility of the Portuguese CFC rules with EU Law 
 
4.1. The Portuguese CFC regime 
 
 
A) Overview 
 
The Portuguese CFC legislation entered into force in 19 February 199580 with the 
purpose of preventing tax avoidance through the dislocation of the residence connecting 
factor and thereby diversion and deferral of passive or other base company income in 
low-tax countries via the setting-up of base companies therein81. It consists of attributing 
(undistributed) CFC profits to Portuguese residents in the proportion of their 
shareholdings. 
 
 
B) First and second conditions: control and low-taxation 
 
Under paragraph 1 of article 66 of the CIRC, resident shareholders are subject to CFC 
rules if: 
 
• they own directly or indirectly (i) 25 per cent or, (ii) where more than 50 per cent 
of the capital is held by Portuguese residents, 10 per cent, of the capital 
    
                                                 
80 Introduced by Decree-Law no. 37/95, of 14 February. 
81 Francisco da Câmara, ‘Limits on the use of low-tax regimes by multinational businesses: current 
measures and emerging trends - National Report (Portugal)’ (2001) Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International 
LXXXVI (b), 777. 
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• of a non-resident company located in a country where it is subject to a ‘clearly 
more favourable regime’. The latter concept is defined (i) as a territory included 
in the Black List approved by Ministerial Order82 or (ii) where the CFC is not 
taxed under income tax or (iii) where – and if - the tax effectively paid is less than 
or equal to 60 per cent of corporate income tax that would be due if the CFC 
was Portuguese resident. 
 
 
C) Third condition: passive income and activity (“exclusion”) 
 
The Portuguese CFC regime only foresees an “exempt activities” exclusion. According to 
paragraph 4 of article 66 of the CIRC, it does not apply where, simultaneously: 
 
a) At least 75 per cent of the CFCs’ profits arise from an agricultural or industrial activity 
in the territory where it is situated, or from a commercial activity that does not have 
Portuguese residents as counterparties, or, having them, is directed predominantly to 
the market of the territory where it is situated; 
 
b) The CFCs’ main activity does not include:  
(i)   Banking activities;  
(ii)  Insurance activities, the income of which is derived primarily from insurance 
of property located outside the CFC’s territory of residence or related to 
persons not residing in that territory. 
(iii) Transactions in shares or securities, intellectual property rights, provision of 
know how or technical assistance; and 
                                                 
82 Ministerial Order no. 150/2004, of February 13. 
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(iv) Rental of assets other than immovable property situated in the CFC’s 
territory of residence. 
 
Thus, the Portuguese CFC legislation provides for one exclusion (sub-paragraph a)), on 
the basis of the type of income derived by the CFC. The said exclusion is, however, 
inapplicable (sub-paragraph b)) where the CFC engages in certain types of - passive - 
businesses. The motive of the shareholder in establishing the CFC is irrelevant (ie there 
is no “motive test” exclusion).  
 
 
4.2. Testing the Portuguese CFC rules against EU Law 
 
 
A) Which freedom? 
 
The Portuguese CFC rules are intended to encompass shareholders which individually or 
jointly have a ‘definite influence on the CFC’s decisions and therefore, in principle, fall 
under the scope of the freedom of establishment’ 83. Nevertheless, they are also likely to 
apply to situations where there is no ‘definite influence’ over the CFCs’ decisions since, 
arguably, that is not necessarily the case where a shareholder has, for example, 25 per 
cent or 10 per cent (where more than 50 per cent of the capital is held by Portuguese 
residents) of the capital. Thus, where a ‘definite influence’ by a particular shareholder 
                                                 
83 See, Cadbury Schweppes, para 31, and Baars, para 22. 
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cannot be found, freedom of capital applies 84 85. Thus, pursuant to article 63 TFEU, the 
Portuguese legislation may also apply to situations involving third countries.86  
 
 
B) Restriction of the Freedom of Establishment 
 
The Portuguese rules treat differently residents incorporating CFCs in a State with a 
clearly more favourable regime vis-à-vis residents incorporating controlled companies in 
the Portuguese territory or in a State without such regime since only the former are taxed 
on the profits of another legal person. This difference in treatment is even more 
apparent if an incorporation of a subsidiary in the Madeira Free Zone  - where, despite 
the favourable tax regime, CFC rules do not apply - is taken into account.  
 
Thus, the difference in treatment and the disadvantage entailed in the Portuguese CFC 
rules hinders the exercise of the freedom of establishment and therefore, constitutes a 
restriction thereof. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 The Portuguese rules entered into force in July 14, 1995. Hence, the standstill clause of article 58 of the 
Treaty does not apply. 
85 See, CFC GLO, para 46. 
86 Since this dissertation focuses only on the freedom of establishment, the assessment of the Portuguese 
CFC rules against the freedom of capital will not be made hereinafter. 
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C) Justification on the grounds of prevention of abusive practices 
 
 
i) Admissibility of the justification 
 
The Portuguese CFC rules are suitable to achieve the objective they pursue as they 
provide for the inclusion of the profits of a CFC in the tax base of the resident company 
and therefore they can frustrate abusive practices with the sole purpose to escape tax due 
on activities carried out in that territory. 
 
 
ii) Proportionality 
 
As to the question whether the CFC rules go beyond what is necessary to achieve its 
purpose, it should be recalled that CFC taxation must be excluded where - under both 
the objective and subjective tests referred above - a wholly artificial arrangement not 
reflecting economic reality is not found in the particular case. The Portuguese CFC rules 
do not foresee objective factors ascertainable by third parties with regard to the extent to 
which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment. Therefore, 
taxation is not excluded in all cases where the incorporation corresponds with an actual 
establishment intended to carry on genuine economic activities. Regarding the subjective 
test, the Portuguese CFC rules do not give any relevance to the motives of the taxpayers.  
 
It is therefore apparent therefore that there is a conflict between the freedom of 
establishment and the wording of the Portuguese CFC rules. Since, in contrast with the 
rules under scrutiny in Cadbury Schweppes, the Portuguese CFC legislation does not 
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provide for a “motive test”. The key question is thus whether the “exempt activities” 
exclusion can lend itself to an interpretation whereby CFC taxation is restricted to wholly 
artificial arrangements without economic reality. 
 
 
4.3. Conforming interpretation 
 
 
A) The concept 
 
Despite the existence of a conflict between the Portuguese CFC legislation and EU law, 
national judges are required by virtue of article 10 TEU to, as far as possible, conform 
national law through legal interpretation in order to achieve the result envisaged by EU 
law. 
 
The content of the principle of conforming interpretation, described simplistically above, 
was jointly set out in Von Colson87, Marleasing88 and Murphy. The first two cases concerned 
to Directives, which, under the respective facts, could not be enforced in judicial 
proceedings (ie did not have “direct effect”) and therefore the said principle was used in 
order to bestow “indirect effect” upon these Directives. In contrast, the Murphy case 
concerned to the application of article 141 of the EC Treaty, which, like the freedom of 
establishment in Cadbury Schweppes, has vertical and horizontal direct effect. It follows 
that, the resort to conforming interpretation in Murphy - and, likewise, in Vodafone 2 - was 
intended to abide by the principle of proportionality since it is less burdensome for both 
                                                 
87 See, Von Colson, para 26. 
88 See, Marleasing, paras 8 and 9. 
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the national and the EU legal systems than the residual solution of simply not applying 
the national rule. In fact, in light of the submission made above in 3.1., A), that the case 
law of the CJEU has confirmed the existence of a (directly applicable) general EU 
principle of prohibition of abuse, the solution of simply not applying the CFC rules not 
only goes beyond the command provided by the freedom of establishment but also 
frustrates the effectiveness of the said principle. In any case, the application of the 
principle of conforming interpretation does not, in this context, create any obligations 
for the taxpayers but it rather constitutes a proportionate reduction of the scope of CFC 
rules in light of the freedom of establishment.  
 
According to settled case law, the “inherent limits” of the principle of conforming 
interpretation are essentially (i) the prohibition of creating obligations for individuals or 
determine or aggravate the liability in criminal law89, (ii) the general principles of law, 
particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and (iii) that it ‘cannot serve as 
the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem.’90 This also seems to be the 
view of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice91, which has stated that the national 
courts are bound by the obligation of conforming interpretation unless it constitutes 
contra legem interpretation. Nevertheless, some scholars consider that conforming 
interpretation can only be carried out where the national rule is ambiguous or leaves 
some discretion as to its interpretation92. Even if this view were to be upheld, it is 
submitted that the Portuguese CFC rules leave in fact some margin of discretion as 
regards to their interpretation and application. Firstly, as noted in the Preamble of the 
                                                 
89 See Arcaro, paras 41 and 42 and Kofoed, para 45. 
90 See, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, para 13 and Adeneler and Others, para 110. 
91 Inter alia, judgement of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice, Proc. no. 03S2467, of 26 February, 
2003. 
92 Tridimas Takis, 'Horizontal effect of Directives: a missed opportunity' (1994) 19 E.L. Rev. 6, 621. 
 49 
Decree-Law which introduced these rules, their rationale is based on ‘the presumably 
instrumental nature’ of the CFCs. It follows that, pursuant to article 73 of the Portuguese 
General Tax Law, taxpayers must always have the opportunity to rebut a rule with a 
presumptive nature (of tax avoidance), even if the objective factors set forth in the CFC 
provision are verified. Secondly, it stems from its nature of anti-avoidance rule that its 
interpretation must take into account the purpose thereof since its rationale is foremost 
to prevent tax avoidance rather than to extend taxation to the factual situations described 
therein. This teleological approach in the interpretation of anti-avoidance rules has in fact 
been adopted by the Portuguese tax administration in several instances, for instance, 
regarding - the now amended - number 8 of article 47 of CIRC, which denied the carry-
over of losses where there was a change in the ownership of more than 50 per cent of 
the share capital of a loss making company in order to avoid the indirect purchase of tax 
losses. According to the Portuguese tax administration93, having in mind the anti-
avoidance purpose of the said provision, it should not be applicable where despite the 
verification of the circumstances foreseen therein there is only an indirect change of 
ownership of the loss making company (eg the acquired company remains in the same 
economic group) since in such a case a tax avoidance conduct can be excluded.   
 
In any case, the fact that the Portuguese Supreme Court has set the bar up to the level of 
the interpretation contra legem shows that the principle of conforming interpretation has a 
‘broad and far-reaching nature.’94 Indeed, whereas the national rules at issue in von Colson 
and in Murphy implemented and executed the invoked EU provision, in Marleasing the 
Court went further and required a conforming interpretation even in the absence of any 
link between the national provisions and the Directive. Thus, it suffices that the meaning 
                                                 
93 Inter alia, Administrative ruling by the State Secretary of Fiscal Affairs, Proc. no. 104/2006, 2008.01.04.  
94 Vodafone 2, para 37. 
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of the EU provision should ‘go with the grain of the legislation’ and be ‘compatible with 
the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed’95. As noted in Kofoed, whilst 
preserving the principle of legal certainty, the effectiveness of EU law can ‘be achieved 
through a general legal context’96. Therefore, the Court accepts that a national ‘provision 
or general principle prohibiting abuse of rights or other provisions on tax evasion or tax 
avoidance may be interpreted in accordance with’97 a Directive, namely, where the latter 
reflects the general EU principle that abuse of rights is prohibited.  
 
 
B) Interpretative methods recognised in the Portuguese legal system 
 
As to the question whether the Portuguese legal system grants interpretative powers, 
which may allow national judges to interpret the CFC rules in accordance with EU law, it 
suffices to note that article 9 of the Portuguese Civil Code allows for the use of both 
subjective and objective elements of interpretation. As regards the subjective elements, it 
seems to be accepted98 that, first, the thinking of the legislator can be resorted to the 
rationale of the law as long as there is a minimum of accordance with the wording 
thereof - in other words, teleological interpretation is accepted. Second, the meaning of 
the law in principle matches with the thinking of the legislator where the latter is clearly 
expressed in secondary legislative materials (such as the Preamble).  
 
  
                                                 
95 Ibid, para 38. 
96 Kofoed, para 44. 
97 Ibid, para 46. 
98 Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado (vol I, fourth edn, Coimbra Editora, 1987), 58. 
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C) Can the Portuguese courts assess the possibility of conforming interpretation  
in light of the “exempt activities” exclusion? 
 
It seems that the fact that the Court in Cadbury Schweppes only referred to the “motive 
test” for purposes of interpretation by national courts in conformity with the respective 
ruling stemmed from the contention by HMRC before the referring court that 
proportionality could be achieve through the “motive test.” Arguably, it follows that the 
Court did not intend to limit conforming interpretation exclusively to the “motive test”. 
As held by the Court of Appeal in Vodafone 2, the UK’s CFC rules could be interpreted 
in the light of ‘the whole of the national law’99 since what is at is at issue is ‘the application 
of interpretative methods recognised by national law’100, which is a competence that 
remains outside the jurisdiction of the CJEU. As observed in Pfeiffer, the principle of 
conforming interpretation ‘requires the referring court to do whatever lies within its 
jurisdiction, having regard to the whole body of rules of national law’101, to ensure that 
EU law is fully effective. In light of the above, the Portuguese national courts may and 
shall take the “exempt activities” exclusion - as well as the whole of the national law - 
into account whilst interpreting the CFC rules in conformity with EU law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 Vodafone 2, para 34. 
100 Pfeiffer, para 116. 
101 Ibid, para 118. See also, Pupino, para 47 and Kofoed, para. 44. 
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D) The purpose of the Portuguese CFC rules in light of the “exempt activities” 
exclusion 
 
As stated by Brian Arnold, ‘the exemption for CFCs engaged in active business (…) is 
one of the major factors that affects the scope of application of a country’s CFC rules 
and (…) reflects, in a fundamental sense, the policy of a country’s CFC rules.’102  
 
The rationale of this exclusion stems from the fact that tax deferral should be preserved 
where resident taxpayers pursue a genuine business activity in the territory of another 
State103 in order for CFC regimes not to adversely affect the international 
competitiveness of businesses. In this context, the criteria relied upon for the limitation 
of the scope of CFC rules concerns to the distinction between income that does not 
presuppose a functional organisation of assets and staff (passive income) and income 
derived from a genuine business activity carried on by the CFC (active income)104. 
Arguably, such a distinction stems mainly from the (broad) presumption that passive 
business income derived from and passive activities carried on in a low-tax country by a 
CFC indicate the existence of an artificial arrangement. As noted above in 4.3., A), in 
                                                 
102 Brian J. Arnold and Patrick Dibout, ‘Limits on the Use of Low Tax Regimes by Multinational Business: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends - General Report’ (2001) 86 Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International 
b, p 59. 
103 See, OECD, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation (Paris, 1996), p 72, according to which, the “exempt 
activities” exclusion rests on the basis that ‘there is justification for exempting CFCs which engage in 
genuine business activities and have a substantial presence in the target territory’. Concurring: Brian J. 
Arnold and Patrick Dibout (n 102), p 40 and Rui Duarte Morais, Imputação de Lucros de Sociedades Não 
Residentes Sujeitas a um Regime Fiscal Privilegiado (Universidade Católica, Porto, 2005), p 367. 
104 International Fiscal Association, ‘Taxation of Domestic Shareholders on Undistributed Income of 
Foreign Affiliates: Objectives, Techniques and Consequences’ (1987) 11 Cahiers de Droit Fiscal 
International - Congress Seminar Series a, p 16. 
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Portugal this presumptive nature of the CFC rules seems to be confirmed in the 
Preamble of the respective Decree-Law.  
 
In light of the above, it is submitted that the “exempt activities” exclusion shows that the 
difference between the requirements outlined in Cadbury Schweppes and the Portuguese 
CFC legislation is more a question of degree than of policy since, in essence, the purpose 
of both is to exclude from taxation CFCs reflecting economic reality. Thus, the 
difference lies on the fact that, whereas the former requires a case-by-case assessment, 
the latter resorts to a presumption of artificiality of the CFC where passive income or 
activities are derived or carried on. In fact, whilst addressing the “exempt activities” 
exclusion, the Court observed in Cadbury Schweppes that ‘the performance by the CFC of 
trading activities excludes, for its part, the existence of an artificial arrangement which 
has no real economic link with the host Member State’. 
 
 
4.4. Solutions for drafting CFC legislation in line with EU Law 
 
The Cadbury Schweppes’ decision entails important consequences for the CFC legislations 
of the Member States. In particular, the formal nature of the “economic reality test” set 
forth therein creates considerable opportunities for abusive tax avoidance in particular 
through the transfer of mobile assets to or rendering of services under cover of a base 
company in a low-tax country. As a result, high-tax Member States may be obliged to 
either raise their effective tax rates on other taxpayers or on non-mobile income or 
reduce their government spending. Furthermore, such consequences also jeopardize the 
ultimate economic and social aims of the EU set forth in article 2 TEU, which underpin 
the establishment of the Common Market. Such consequences ensue from the fact that, 
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as explained above in 3.1., B), i), the justification of prevention of abusive practices does 
not address the issue of tax avoidance as such but solely the issue of abuse of EU law. 
  
In this context, the justification on grounds of tax avoidance (taken together with the 
need to prevent a balanced allocation of taxing rights) set forth in SGI should not be 
overlooked by the Member States, namely since it has a wider scope than the justification 
dealt with in Cadbury Schweppes105. Therefore, it is submitted that Member States – namely, 
Portugal – should not be satisfied in merely amending their CFC legislations in order to 
simply limit its scope to wholly artificial arrangements without economic reality106 but 
should rather find a way to reform it in such a way as to tackle effectively tax avoidance 
whilst complying with EU law. Therefore, some proposals will be briefly outlined below.  
 
 
A) Extension of the piercing of the veil approach107 
 
The Columbus Container case demonstrates that a resident shareholder can be taxed on the 
profits of a CFC on an arising basis without entailing different treatment as long as both 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries are treated as fiscally transparent. In such a case, it 
must be borne in mind that equal treatment would only be ensured if fiscal transparency 
                                                 
105 See above in 3.1. B), iii). 
106 Compare with Communication on the application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation - 
within the EU and in relation to third countries (COM(2007) 785 final) and Guglielmo Maisto and 
Pasquale Pistone, ‘A European Model for Member States’ Legislation on the Taxation of Controlled 
Foreign Subsidiaries (CFCs) – Part 1’ (2008) ET 10, p 510 (s.d.) where the idea of developing an EU 
Model or establishing common definitions focusing on abuse and wholly artificial arrangements is 
supported.  
107 This proposal, and the detailed aspects thereof, are formulated in Alexander Rust, ‘CFC Legislation and 
EC Law’ (2008) 36 Intertax 11, 492. 
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were also attributed to subsidiaries resident in all Member States and – where freedom of 
capital is engaged – in third countries. On the other hand, Capital Export Neutrality can 
be achieved by providing for an ordinary tax credit for the domestic and foreign 
corporate income taxes levied upon the domestic or foreign subsidiaries. As long as the 
credit method is applicable equally to all Member States, there is no different treatment. 
In such a case, any disadvantages arising from the differences in the tax rates of the 
Member States constitute merely a disparity and are therefore not in breach of EU law108.  
 
 
B) Justification on grounds of tax avoidance taken together  
with the justification of preserving a balanced allocation of taxing rights 
 
As noted above, the Court highlighted in Cadbury Schweppes that the type of conduct 
targeted by CFC rules also undermines the balance in allocation of taxing rights of the 
Member States.  
 
Additionally, it confirmed in SGI that legislation not specifically related to wholly 
artificial arrangements can still be justified by the need to prevent tax avoidance, taken 
together with the preservation of a balanced allocation of taxing rights. Indeed, the thin 
capitalisation cases constitute a good illustration for the purposes of drafting anti-abuse 
legislation in such a way as to be encompassed by the aforementioned justification.  
 
                                                 
108 Differently, Alexander Rust (n 101), p 499 who holds the view that ‘the credit entitlement depends on 
the amount of taxes paid by the controlled companies. This differential treatment is justified by the need to 
preserve the cohesion of the tax system.’ 
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In this regard, it must be noted, firstly, that there are fundamental distinctions between 
the manner how thin capitalisation and CFC legislation have been traditionally drafted, 
due to which the Court could not have applied the reasoning held in SGI to the CFC 
legislation at issue in Cadbury Schweppes. With effect, on the one hand, the use of the arm’s 
length test in the thin capitalisation legislation constitutes an objective element which 
allows to ascertain whether the transaction in question represents ‘in whole or in part, a 
purely artificial arrangement’, and, consequently, to disregard only the artificial part of 
the arrangement (ie the part exceeding the arm’s length value). In contrast, like in Cadbury 
Schweppes, the Portuguese CFC legislation adopts an all-or-nothing approach whereby the 
establishment is fully disregarded, regardless of the extent of the degree of economic 
substance thereof. Therefore, the Court requires the existence of a “wholly” artificial 
arrangement.  
 
Secondly, the Court has drawn a distinction between rules of the host state pertaining to 
access and rules pertaining to the exercise of an activity109. Namely, in Centros, the Court 
noted that ‘the provisions of national law, application of which the parties concerned 
have sought to avoid, are rules governing the formation of companies and not rules 
concerning the carrying on of certain trades, professions or businesses.’110 Nevertheless, 
the Court stressed that Denmark was not precluded “from adopting any appropriate 
measure for preventing or penalising fraud.”111 
 
Thus, it made it clear that, since “the right to form a company in accordance with the law 
of a Member State and to set up branches in other Member States is inherent in the 
                                                 
109 See, Tridimas Takis (n 51), 14. 
110 Centros, para 26. 
111 Centros, para 38. 
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exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty”112, 
Member States could not impede nationals from acquiring, creating or maintaining an 
establishment in another Member State (ie prevent jurisdiction shopping) as long as there 
were genuine economic activities being carried on. Similarly to Centros, in Cadbury 
Schweppes also access rules were at stake since the CFC rules disregarded - for tax 
purposes - the creation of establishments in other Member States (preventing thereby tax 
jurisdiction shopping). Therefore, the Court held that there could be deemed to exist a 
wholly artificial arrangement only where the elements of the concept of establishment (ie 
an actual establishment intended to pursue genuine economic activities) did not exist. 
 
It follows that, drafting anti-abuse legislation in the light of transfer pricing principles 
(namely, by allocating profits in accordance with the economic substance of an 
enterprise, as set out, for instance, in the Authorized OECD Approach) rather than 
simply disregarding the establishment of a CFC in another Member State could allow 
such legislation to be justified on the grounds of prevention of tax avoidance taken 
together with the need to preserve a balanced allocation of taxing rights, since: 
 
a) the right of the resident shareholder to acquiring, creating or maintaining a 
CFC would not be affected, and, therefore, anti-abuse rules could be justified 
regardless of the existence or not of a “wholly” artificial arrangement; and 
 
b) only the proportion of the profits accruing to the CFC in excess of its 
economic substance and genuineness of its services would be added to the 
resident shareholder (which would preserve proportionality). 
 
                                                 
112 Centros, para 27. 
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This approach somewhat resembles to that reflected in the UK’s section 751A ICTA 
1988, which, following the Cadbury Schweppes decision, was introduced to ensure 
compatibility with EU law. According thereto, the resident company may be entitled to 
reduce the chargeable profits of the CFC thereupon up to the extent of the “net 
economic value” of the latter, which, in its turn, is considered to being created by 
individuals working for the CFC. Nevertheless, a more perceived view of the benefits of 
a transfer pricing approach seems to be inherent in the latest discussions on the ongoing 
consultations on the proposed CFC improvements in the UK. Namely, as per the 
minutes of the working group meeting held in September 16, 2010113, the HMRC/HMT 
suggested, as regards the definition of commercial justification, that it ‘should be based 
on what would have been the allocation of profits had the entities in question been 
unconnected and operating in a fully competitive environment.’ Some Members also 
suggested that transfer pricing rules would ensure the appropriate allocation of profits 
between the UK and the CFC and therefore questioned why both transfer pricing and 
CFC rules were needed. In this regard, the HMRC/HMT  - apparently addressing the 
issue of the transfer of highly-mobile income generating assets and finance services to 
low-tax States - restated their view that transfer pricing rules do not adequately protect 
the UK tax base in all circumstances. This approach is also somewhat implicit in the 
Council Resolution of 8 June 2010 on coordination of the CFC and thin capitalisation 
rules within the EU114, which provides a non-exhaustive list of indicators suggesting that 
profits may have been artificially diverted. Those indicators go beyond the guidance 
                                                 
113 HM Treasury, 'Minutes: CFC interim improvements working group meeting', 16 September 2010, 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/cfc_working_group_minutes_16092010.pdf> last accessed 10 
November 2010.  
114 Council Resolution of 8 June 2010 on coordination of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and 
thin capitalisation rules within the European Union, 2010/C 156/01. 
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provided by the Court in Cadbury Schweppes115 and include, namely, the cases where there 
are insufficiently valid economic or commercial reasons for the profit attribution. 
Apparently in the wake of the SGI decision, this Resolution also acknowledged the 
justification of the need to prevent tax avoidance taken together with the need to 
preserve a balanced allocation of taxing rights.  
 
In light of the above, it is submitted that, provided that an all-or-nothing approach - 
whereby the CFC would be disregarded - is not adopted, it seems that anti-abuse rules 
targeting the use of base companies could be justified if operating on the basis of profit 
attribution according with the degree of economic substance of the CFC (which could 
vary between nil and 100 per cent). In this regard, the criteria set out in the OECD 
Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments 116 could constitute a 
starting point. This Report provides guidelines for a functional and factual analysis (ie a 
case-by-case approach) which, whilst identifying the economically significant activities 
and responsibilities undertaken by the foreign enterprise, allows to ascertain the 
functions, risks and economic ownership of assets and capital of that (hypothesised) 
distinct and separate enterprise. The said Report is drafted in such a way (ie 
supplementing article 9 of the OECD Model) as to solve the issues created by the 
absence of any legal transaction between different parts of a single entity117. Similarly, the 
purpose of anti-abuse rules targeting the use of base companies is to address artificial 
arrangements through which the legal ownership of assets, risks and capital is transferred 
                                                 
115 Tom O'Shea, 'Winds of Change on the EU Fiscal Coordination Front' [2010] 204-4  WTD 10 . 
116 OECD, 'Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, Part I: General 
Considerations', (17 July 2008). 
117 Nevertheless, the criteria set out in the said Report has also been applied to cases involving separate 
entities. See, OECD, Report on the Transfer Pricing aspects of business restructurings, Chapter IX of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines (22 July 2010), para 9.19 et seq.  
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to the CFC whilst the economic ownership remains with or should be attributed to the 
resident shareholder. Thus, by attributing the risks, economic ownership of assets and an 
arm’s length amount of interest funding (commensurate with those functions, assets and 
risks attributed) to the CFC in light of the criteria set out in the said Report, the profits 
of the CFC could be determined in accordance with the economic substance thereof. 
Moreover, the criteria provided by the said Report goes beyond the correction of a non-
arm’s length price in transactions between related parties and allows to prevent the 
erosion of the tax base of the origin State where highly-mobile income generating assets 
(eg IP and cash) and services are artificially transferred through legal conduits to a CFC. 
 
 
C) Harmonisation of the concept of “tax avoidance” at EU level 
 
As noted above, the EU law general principle of prohibition of abuse ‘serves as a residual 
anti-evasion doctrine to ensure fulfilment of the purposes of’118 EU law. Therefore, its 
effect on the prevention of the circumvention of national law - in particular, as regards 
tax avoidance - remains limited. As a result, the final goal of the EU of establishing the 
Common Market to promote harmonious, balanced and sustainable social and economic 
development may not be fully achieved. Indeed, the achievement of an Internal Market 
through the abolition of obstacles to the freedom of movement constitutes a mean 
rather than an end in itself. Nevertheless, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, 
the Court cannot allow any breach of the freedoms of movement even if that may 
jeopardise the said political objectives of the EU. Since they affect the establishment or 
functioning of the common market, one of the means that could be adopted in order to 
legitimise the fight by the States against tax avoidance beyond wholly artificial 
                                                 
118 Tridimas Takis (n 51), p 36. 
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arrangements without economic reality is the harmonisation at EU level of the concept 
of tax avoidance. In this regard, a prime example can be seen in the area of financial law, 
where the concept of abuse has acquired specific statutory meaning in the Directive 
2003/6 on Market Abuse, which prohibits “market manipulation”. Indeed, enacting a 
Directive containing a prohibition of tax avoidance would make it less necessary for the 
Member States to rely on the general doctrine of abuse since the purpose would be to 
tackle practices that not only ostensibly constitute tax avoidance but also cases where 
there is likelihood of the existence of tax avoidance. As to the well-known resilience by 
Member States to transfer their tax competences to the EU, such a Directive could be 
drafted in such a way as to not precluding the Member States from choosing the means 
deemed convenient to tackle the abusive practices at stake. Lastly, the possibility of such 
a solution has been favoured by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, 
which provides for an “enhanced cooperation” legislative procedure whereby it suffices 
the participation of nine Member States thus displacing the “veto” power of the Member 
States.   
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5. Conclusion 
 
In spite of the evolution in the Court’s case law in the area of tax avoidance, the 
discussion above has demonstrated that it seems possible to answer the questions raised 
in Chapter 1 whilst taking into account the whole body of case law. 
 
 
Prohibition of abuse of EU law 
 
As shown above in 3.1., it seems apparent that there is a general EU principle of 
prohibition of abuse reflected in the Court’s case law. First, such principle has been 
expressly recognised by the Court in Kofoed. Second, and most importantly, following the 
reasoning held namely in Centros, Inspire Art and Paletta II, the existence of such a 
principle is implicit in the Cadbury Schweppes decision. With effect, similarly to the 
approach seen in the anti-abuse doctrines adopted by the Member States (namely, in 
Portugal), the assessment of abuse – in particular, of the artificiality of the arrangement - 
by the Court consists in a comparison between the arrangement used by the taxpayer and 
the purpose and objectives of the allegedly abused provision. In this regard, as seen in 
Cadbury Schweppes, the abused provision taken into account by the Court is the EU law 
provision granting freedom of movement rights to the taxpayer rather than the national 
fiscal provision being circumvented. Thus, also materially, it is clear that the Court 
adopts an autonomous EU concept of abuse.  
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Justification on grounds of abusive practices (wholly artificial arrangements) 
 
The confirmation of the existence of a general EU principle of prohibition of abuse thus 
triggers the question whether the aforementioned justification constitutes in essence a 
justification on grounds of tax avoidance as such (i.e. to prevent abuse of national fiscal 
provisions) or, rather, a justification in line with the said EU principle (ie to prevent 
abuse of EU law provisions). Despite the fact that in ICI, X and Y and in de Lasteyrie the 
Court dealt with the issue of abuse separately from the aforementioned justification, it 
has been explained above that as from Cadbury Schweppes onwards (including, namely, in 
Thin Cap and CFC GLO) the Court adopted a more perceived approach and intertwined 
such justification with the EU principle of abuse under the denomination of “prevention 
of abusive practices”. Indeed, in Cadbury Schweppes the Court stressed that, even where 
the set up of a CFC is solely motivated by tax considerations, a restriction of the freedom 
of establishment is only encompassed by the aforementioned justification to the extent 
that such freedom is not being actually and genuinely exercised. Thus, it is clear that the 
aforementioned justification focuses on the abuse of EU provisions rather than on tax 
avoidance as such (i.e. abuse of national fiscal provisions). Moreover, the above 
submission is also confirmed by the fact that the Court has shifted the analysis of abuse 
towards the context of justification, when, in fact, it could have dealt with it – as it had 
done, namely, in Van Binbergen and in Gullung - as a Treaty entitlement issue. The 
conclusion that the aforementioned justification does not address, on a stand-alone basis, 
the issue of tax avoidance as such is consistent with the Court’s case law since Avoir Fiscal 
- as well as in X and Y and in de Lasteyrie - where the Court stressed that tax evasion could 
not justify any restriction of the fundamental freedoms. Likewise, it is also consistent 
with the Court’s case law in the non-tax area, namely, in Centros, Inspire Art, Chen and 
Akrich, where the Court confirmed that there is no abuse – and, therefore, a restriction 
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of the fundamental freedoms cannot be justified - where the rights provided by EU law 
are genuinely exercised. 
 
 
Justification on grounds of prevention of (the risk of) tax avoidance 
 
In light of the conclusions above that (i) there is a general EU principle of prohibition of 
abuse, (ii) the justification concerning anti-avoidance rules specifically targeted at wholly 
artificial arrangements is a corollary of such principle and (iii) the Court has not upheld 
any stand-alone justification on grounds of tax avoidance (as such), the question arises as 
to whether the Court accepts any justification involving tax avoidance as such. 
 
As seen above in 3.1. B), ii), following the decisions in Marks&Spencer and in Oy AA the 
Court made it clear in its recent decision in SGI that national legislation not specifically 
designed to exclude wholly artificial arrangements could still be justified with the need to 
prevent tax avoidance, provided that it could be taken together with that of preserving 
the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States. The 
Court thus seems to accept two different sets of justifications in the context of tax 
avoidance. Therefore, Member States should not overlook the latter justification, since it 
seems to have a wider scope than the former. 
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Two-pronged abuse test 
 
The assessment of the two-pronged abuse test made above in 3.3. has also shown that, 
due to the high level of artificiality required by the Court in Cadbury Schweppes, the scope 
of the justification concerning measures specifically targeted at wholly artificial 
arrangements is rather narrow and may thus not be sufficient to prevent abusive tax 
avoidance. This is enhanced by the conclusion that the Court’s judgement in Cadbury 
Schweppes did not seem to lay the burden of proof upon the taxpayer but, as 
demonstrated with CFC GLO and Thin Cap, it rather requires Member States to show 
that the CFC does not have “economic reality”. As to the subjective test, it has been 
shown that it plays a residual role vis-à-vis the objective test since it is also based in 
objective circumstances. 
 
 
Are Portuguese CFC rules compatible with EU Law? 
 
It is apparent that, at a first moment, there is a conflict between the freedom of 
establishment and the wording of the Portuguese CFC rules. Due to the similarity of the 
latter with the UK’s CFC rules in Cadbury Schweppes it can be seen above in 4.2. that such 
conclusion was, for the most part, carved out from the said judgement. In particular, the 
Portuguese CFC rules do not foresee objective factors ascertainable by third parties with 
regard to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and 
equipments. In contrast, however, they do not contain any “motive test”.  
 
Notwithstanding such conflict, like in Vodafone 2, it has been concluded above in 4.3. that 
the Portuguese CFC rules may be interpreted in conformity with the Cadbury Schweppes 
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decision. Similarly to the reasoning of the Court in its decision in Murphy, this ensures 
proportionality in the direct applicability of the freedom of establishment and, moreover, 
the effectiveness of the general EU principle of prohibition of abuse implicit in Cadbury 
Schweppes since, otherwise, the Portuguese CFC rules might have to be removed. The said 
conclusion follows, first, from the fact that, as is apparent in the Preamble that 
introduced the CFC rules, they have a presumptive and anti-avoidance nature. Second, 
and foremost, the “exempt activities” exclusion reflects, in a fundamental sense, that the 
policy of these rules is to exempt CFCs which engage in genuine business activities and 
have a substantial presence in the target territory. In other words, the purpose of these 
rules can be equated to the one in the Cadbury Schweppes’ decision. Third, the Portuguese 
Supreme Court seems to only refuse conforming interpretation where the result is contra 
legem. 
 
 
Solutions for drafting CFC rules compatible with EU Law 
 
It follows from the discussion in Chapter 3 that, since the justification set out by the 
Court in Cadbury Schweppes is aimed at tackling abuse of the freedom of establishment 
rather than preventing the circumvention of national tax rules, its scope in the context of 
national anti-abuse rules is narrow. As observed in Chapter 4, the design of CFC rules 
merely in light of the said judgement seems to create considerable opportunities for tax 
avoidance, which, jeopardizes the ultimate aims of the Common Market. Thus, three 
possible solutions for tackling tax avoidance through the use of base companies have 
been put forward.  
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As a concluding remark, it is submitted that resorting - under the justification on grounds 
of tax avoidance (taken together with the need to preserve a balanced allocation of taxing 
rights) set forth in SGI - to an economic allocation of profits under transfer pricing 
principles would perhaps constitute the best solution for a reform of the Portuguese 
CFC regime. This would safeguard several features which are desirable in a tax system. 
First, it would be proportionate, for only the artificial part of the profits would be 
encompassed. Second, it would protect horizontal fairness, in that it constitutes an 
effective anti-avoidance measure which, namely, tackles the transfer of income 
generating assets abroad. Lastly, it would not be dependent on the amendment of other 
fundamental features of the tax system nor on an agreement with the other Member 
States. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that – just as with the current CFC rules – such a 
solution requires a sophistication of the means and personnel in the Portuguese tax 
administration.       
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